​The question of how to justify, address and regulate inheritance is of crucial importance for egalitarians. If contemporary market societies have a tendency to concentrate wealth and capital, the taxation of inheritance and of inter vivos gifts may be one important way to mitigate this dynamic. Whether inheritance should be taxed is an issue that has, however, been fairly neglected by theorists, particularly in the realm of political philosophy. There is also evidence that it arouses a greater deal of opposition than other purportedly egalitarian proposals, namely a wealth tax; opposition not only from the most advantaged but also by those who could gain the most from it.
A concern with the fair value of equality of opportunity may be a consideration in favour of an inheritance tax of some kind. John Rawls defines fair equality of opportunity as equal access to elite positions within institutions (e.g., education, but also political offices, jobs, amongst others) for persons who are similarly endowed and motivated. Unequal wealth inheritance concedes some a comparative advantage in the pursuit of further education and in obtaining cultural resources – in the form of travel, for example – that afford one a greater chance to succeed. Concerns with the impacts of segregation and transmission of social capital might also favour inheritance taxation, if we establish the role inheritance has in transmitting both financial and non-financial capital.
But arguments against inheritance taxation need to be taken seriously, and raise important concerns for a theory of distributive justice, but also claims of economic efficiency. Liberals might argue in defence of inheritance as an important and strong incentive to accumulate wealth. Such an incentive might be essential for further investments and the promotion of economic growth through private ventures. It may also be that inheritance helps keep the middle-class from shrinking, especially during periods of slow wage growth for younger adults.
Inheritance, and its taxation, lies in the intersection of universal claims (such as the fair value of equality of opportunities) and claims of partiality. In this respect, concerns with how taxing inheritance might jeopardise family values might justify having unrestricted inheritance flows, particularly within families.
Finally, it is important to consider how inheritance fits in the institutional framework of a theory of distributive justice. It is particularly important to understand how to include inheritance tax within existing tax systems, while trying to accommodate the subtleties of the moral arguments one might claim when arguing in favour of taxing inheritance. Such considerations are of particular relevance for public policy and will also be considered in our discussion.

​The question of how to justify, address and regulate inheritance is of crucial importance for egalitarians. If contemporary market societies have a tendency to concentrate wealth and capital, the taxation of inheritance and of inter vivos gifts may be one important way to mitigate this dynamic. Whether inheritance should be taxed is an issue that has, however, been fairly neglected by theorists, particularly in the realm of political philosophy. There is also evidence that it arouses a greater deal of opposition than other purportedly egalitarian proposals, namely a wealth tax; opposition not only from the most advantaged but also by those who could gain the most from it.
A concern with the fair value of equality of opportunity may be a consideration in favour of an inheritance tax of some kind. John Rawls defines fair equality of opportunity as equal access to elite positions within institutions (e.g., education, but also political offices, jobs, amongst others) for persons who are similarly endowed and motivated. Unequal wealth inheritance concedes some a comparative advantage in the pursuit of further education and in obtaining cultural resources – in the form of travel, for example – that afford one a greater chance to succeed. Concerns with the impacts of segregation and transmission of social capital might also favour inheritance taxation, if we establish the role inheritance has in transmitting both financial and non-financial capital.
But arguments against inheritance taxation need to be taken seriously, and raise important concerns for a theory of distributive justice, but also claims of economic efficiency. Liberals might argue in defence of inheritance as an important and strong incentive to accumulate wealth. Such an incentive might be essential for further investments and the promotion of economic growth through private ventures. It may also be that inheritance helps keep the middle-class from shrinking, especially during periods of slow wage growth for younger adults.
Inheritance, and its taxation, lies in the intersection of universal claims (such as the fair value of equality of opportunities) and claims of partiality. In this respect, concerns with how taxing inheritance might jeopardise family values might justify having unrestricted inheritance flows, particularly within families.
Finally, it is important to consider how inheritance fits in the institutional framework of a theory of distributive justice. It is particularly important to understand how to include inheritance tax within existing tax systems, while trying to accommodate the subtleties of the moral arguments one might claim when arguing in favour of taxing inheritance. Such considerations are of particular relevance for public policy and will also be considered in our discussion.